1 The Singapore and the New Taiwan dollar experienced a relatively small depreciation. During the crisis, no significant devaluation took place in China, which remained relatively insulated from world financial markets. 2 As an initial response to the crisis, Malaysia followed the orthodox IMF policy prescriptions without the IMF involvement -nam ely, tightened fiscal and monetary policies, introduced measures to redress the balance of payment weakness, and floated the exchange rate. A huge part o f ex cessiv e short-term external liabilities can be explained by asymmetric regulations on short-term borrowing vis-à-vis long-term borrowing. The government boosted incentives for short-term debts by m aking it mandatory to provide detailed information and obtain perm ission from the regulatory authorities in the case o f long-term borrowing, whereas short-term borrowing w as regarded as trade related financing and therefore not strictly regulated under the Foreign Exchange M anagem ent Law. Thus, banks and firms had been operating on a long-term basis with short-term foreign borrowings, leading to a significant discrepancy in the maturity structure (K im et al.. 2001).
Post-crisis macroeconomic adjustments in Korea and
Furthermore, the maturity m ism atch w as more serious for merchant banks.3 For exam ple, the liquidity ratio in foreign currency for merchant banks w as only three to six percent for all the period up to the financial crisis. Thirty merchant banks becam e heavily engaged in offshore operations by borrowing cheap short-term Japanese funds from H ong K ong to finance m ostly long-term investm ent projects. W ith 80% short-term debts put into 70% long-term assets, the maturity m ism atch blew up w hen K orea's credibility plum meted. Pressured to obtain foreign currency to repay their debts, merchant banks ultim ately ended up buying foreign currency on the spot market with w on-denom inated call loans from com m ercial banks. Furthermore, those merchant banks were not properly supervised. Neither unified accounting standards nor standards for classifying non-perform ing loans existed, and supervision had been perfunctory at best. This lax supervision allow ed merchant banks to enjoy freedom without any discipline. W hen Korea embarked on the IMF structural adjustment program, merchant banks were the first to go through restructuring because their volum inous short-term external debts and imprudent investm ents were inconsistent with the custom ary practices o f the world financial market.
ii. O verall m a cro eco n o m ic a n d se cto ra l p erfo rm a n c e
The impact o f the financial crisis on the real econom y becam e apparent in the first quarter o f 1998 as G DP contracted b y 4.6% on a year-on-year basis. Throughout 1998, the deterioration o f m acroeconom ic conditions far exceeded the expectations o f both Korean policy makers and IM F econom ists. For exam ple, the second IM F agreement forecast that real G DP w ould fall by 1% or less in 1998, but it actually shrank 6.7%. D espite a relatively im pressive growth rate for exports (13.3% in dom estic currency value) in 1998,5 private consum ption, investm ent, and imports dramatically declined (see table 2). Non-tradable sectors, such as construction, were hit harder than the manufacturing sector, which is more trade-oriented. A s output contracted, unem ploym ent quickly increased from 2.1% in October 1997 to 8.7% in February 1999. The real w ages o f workers in the manufacturing sector fell by 11% in 1998.
3 Most merchant banks in Korea started as investment banks after the Decree of August 3, 1972, to provide legitimate channels to utilize black market funds. They were modeled after the British merchant banks but were also permitted to engage in the financing o f medium-and long-term equipment investment. Later in 1994 and 1996, the 24 existing investment banks were allowed to become merchant banks, joining the six existing ones. Several merchant banks, owned by chaebols, served as important vehicles for raising the funds required for the chaebols' voluminous investments; these affiliate banks failed to conduct adequate loan assessments of their parent companies. 4 The Korean government suspended the operations o f the 14 unhealthiest merchant banks in December 1997. 5 In dollar terms, however, even exports recorded negative growth.
After a sharp contraction, the Korean econom y started to bottom out in the first quarter o f 1999. In 1999, real G DP growth recorded 10.7%, overshooting its pre-crisis average o f 7%. Growth was led b y buoyant private consum ption, a rebound in equipment investm ent, and a slow er pace o f inventory de-stocking. Due to the strengthening o f the econom y, the unem ploym ent rate sharply declined from the record level o f 8.7% in February 1999 to 4.4% in Novem ber 1999, w hile inflation remained low , notwithstanding depreciation.
The sharp contraction and the rapid recovery o f Korea's growth rate are broadly consistent with the V-shaped adjustment patterns observed in cross-country analyses. H owever, the magnitude o f initial contraction and the speed o f recovery in Korea are in sharp contrast with the stylized pattern. The margin betw een a 6.7% decline in 1998 and a 10.7% recovery o f GDP in 1999 is far greater than predicted by the cross-country evidence. M alaysia also experienced a huge jum p in G DP growth from a 7.4% decline in 1998 to a 6.1% recovery in 1999.
One fundamental question relates to whether the output reduction after the A sian crisis was a temporary deviation downward from the trend level, w hich was eventually reversed as output reverted to trend, or alternatively, whether the level o f output tended to shift down permanently. Cerra and Saxena (2003) find that the recovery phase is predominantly characterized by a return to the normal growth rate o f an expansion. Thus, the level o f output is permanently low er than its initial trend path. A permanent loss is associated with a downward shift o f potential output, whereas a temporary loss is associated with a deterioration o f the output gapimportant structural factors driving the speedy adjustment in Korea were flexibility and openness (Park, 2001 ). W ith a relatively large trade sector oriented towards exports, Korea was able to benefit from a substantial depreciation o f the real exchange rate and fall in real wages. The labor market adjustments were less rigid than had been assumed. A s a consequence, a more dramatic adjustment took place in the manufacturing sector. The manufacturing sector recorded a large decline o f 7.4% in 1998, but quickly rebounded to record a growth o f 21.0% in 1999. On the other hand, the construction sector, a typical non-tradable, suffered a continuous recession in 1999. iii.
E xchange rate
Thailand's sudden decision to float the baht in July 1997 subjected all regional currencies to extrem ely high depreciation pressure. H owever, the Korean w on remained relatively stable until it began to slide in October 1997. F ollow ing futile attempts o f currency defense, the Korean governm ent w idened its w on trading band from 2.25% to 10% on N ovem ber, and finally abolished its band, allow ing the w on to float on Decem ber. W ith a free floating regim e in place, the sudden collapse o f investor confidence and concom itant capital outflow s caused the nom inal exchange rate to overshoot during the crisis.
Large support packages by the IMF did make som e contribution to restoring the confidence o f foreign investors. The funding helped to reduce the short-term liquidity constraints o f the econom y and provided financial resources to contain the exchange rate depreciation. The Korean governm ent expected that its agreement with the IMF, reached on D ecem ber 3, 1997, w ould stop the outflow o f foreign capital. H ow ever, foreign banks withdrew their short-term credit at an accelerated pace, thereby worsening Korea's foreign reserve position (see table 2). In response to this unfavorable developm ent, the Korean government asked the major creditor countries, including the U .S. and Japan, to use moral suasion to influence their creditors to refrain from retrieving their short-term credit, and cooperate in reaching an agreement to lengthen the maturity o f the short-term foreign currency loans. Only when foreign creditors were convinced that they w ould be repaid with handsome returns, were the debt-extension agreements signed and finalized on March, 1998.6 Thereafter, at least som e foreign credit facilities including trade credit was restored and the exchange rate cam e to stabilize at around 1,300-1,400 w on per U S dollar.
iv. E q u ity m arket
After hitting its highest level (1,138 points) on N ovem ber 8, 1994, the Korean stock price index (KOSPI) had already started sliding before the crisis broke out. This w as one o f the earliest signs o f trouble, although policy makers were inclined to believe that the declining stock prices were m ainly due to cyclical factors rather than w eak fundamentals. During 1996, stock prices (in dom estic currency terms) fell by more than 20% in Korea. Several Another vulnerable point for M alaysia was the seem ingly stable ringgit exchange rate. The large w eight o f the U S dollar in the currency basket (estim ated at about 70%) had indirectly created a de facto pegged exchange rate regim e for the ringgit. Even with the large capital inflow in the second half o f the 1990s, the ringgit was traded within a very narrow band at around RM 2.5 for one U S dollar. This exchange rate stability had given the im pression that there w as no risk associated with the flow s o f funds and subsequently attracted large short-term capital into M alaysia without the fear o f possible exchange rate losses. W ith sufficient international reserves to m eet foreign exchange demand, there w as little concern that M alaysia w ould confront an econom ic crisis when the baht w as floated in July 12 SMEs are defined as enterprises employing less than 300 workers in the manufacturing sector and 20 workers in the service sector. In order to ease financial difficulties o f the SMEs, the Bank of Korea raised the ceiling on total loans from KRW 3.6 trillion (in November 1997) to KRW 5.6 trillion (in February 1998). Further, the Bank of Korea overhauled the 90-day maturity clause on commercial bills, which qualify for discount (effective beginning May 1998). In addition, the government gave an extension of maturity o f loans, which are made out to SMEs. (table 3) 
In 1997, M alaysia's international reserves o f U S $28 billion were sufficient to cover the short-term debt o f U S $14 billion in 1997

ii. O verall m acro eco n o m ic a n d secto ra l p erfo rm a n c e
Although the Asian crisis began in the m iddle o f 1997, its impact on the M alaysian econom y w as only felt in late 1997. G DP grew at a com m endable rate o f 7.3% in 1997 but the 13 Due to the prudential measures exercised by the Bank Negara Malaysia, there was no massive build-up of short term foreign borrowings. Malaysian companies are required to have a natural foreign exchange hedge before they are allowed to borrow overseas. Normally, the natural hedge means that the companies would have foreign currency income to service the loans. econom ic contraction w as very deep at -7.4% in 1998 (table 4). This severe contraction was due to a com bination o f several factors: the deflationary force o f the regional econom ic slow dow n, m assive capital outflow s, public sector expenditure reduction and a tight m onetary policy. This econom ic contraction was brought about by a severe collapse in private investm ent (-57.8% ) and consum ption (-10.8% ). The public sector also experienced a sim ilar decline but at a lesser rate -fo r exam ple, public investment fell by 10% and consum ption by 7.8%. The reduction in private sector investm ent w as caused by a lack o f liquidity in the banking system due to the introduction o f a tighter monetary policy in late 1997. Prior to the crisis, credit grew on average about 28% annually betw een 1994 and 1996 and the Bank Negara M alaysia (the M alaysian central bank) introduced a credit plan to curb the ex cessiv e lending especially to the non productive sector such as real estate and loans to buy shares. In addition to a credit growth target o f 25% by year-end 1997 and 15% by year-end 1998, the plan also disallow ed credit for "unproductive" sectors. Higher interest rates added further pressure to the funding costs o f com panies and had caused an imm ediate slow dow n o f business activities. External debt service ratio 6.6 5.5 6.7 5.9 5.3 5.9 6.2
The sectoral share in expenditure and in GDP in 1996 is given in brackets. b/ Based on manufacturing production index (1993 = 100).
-Data not available.
-MIER: Malaysian Institute of Economic Research.
iii.
E xch a n g e rate At the onset o f the crisis, w hen regional currencies were under pressure to devalue, M alaysia tried to defend the ringgit but found this strategy unsustainable and costly. On July 14, the ringgit was floated and it depreciated sharply during the second half o f 1997 -th e ringgit exchange rate slipped from R M 2.50 per U S dollar to its low est level o f R M 4.88 on January 7, 1998. After show ing som e signs o f stability during February and March 1998, the ringgit, unlike the currencies o f the other crisis-hit econom ies, continued to deteriorate with a wide range o f volatility in the follow in g months until it was fixed at R M 3.80 per U S dollar on September 1998. The sharp depreciation and volatility o f the ringgit could be attributed to the large capital outflow and strong market reaction to M alaysia's vocal stand on currency speculation.
iv. E q u ity m a rket
The 
Policy responses for crisis resolution
Concerning m acroeconom ic policies, the sw ift change in p olicy stance from tightening to easing supported the quick recovery o f the crisis-hit econom ies. In Korea, although fiscal and monetary policies differed in the points at which the policy stance changed (fiscal stim ulus first, monetary easing m ore cautiously), the policy target under the IMF program shifted from stabilization o f the foreign exchange market to econom ic recovery around April 1998. In M alaysia, although independent m acroeconom ic policies could be adopted from the beginning o f the crisis, counter cyclical p olicy measures only becam e fully effective from A ugust 1998 due to internal politics. reduces default risk for those with unhedged foreign currency debt exposure (IMF, 2000) . B y contrast, critics contended that although it m ay have been necessary to increase interest rates initially, they were kept high for too long, plunging the econom y into a vicious cycle o f declining output, increasing bankruptcies, and further w eakening o f the financial sector -a ll o f which served to weaken rather than shore-up investor confidence (Furman and Stiglitz, 1998). A number o f studies have tried to assess em pirically whether high interest rates have been useful in supporting the exchange rate. In general, the empirical evidence is inconclusive.
During the early period o f crisis resolution, several other m easures were also sim ultaneously im plem ented to stabilize the exchange market. Tight m acroeconom ic policies were only one com ponent o f many. Thus, it is extrem ely difficult to single out the impact o f stringent m acroeconom ic p olicies on the exchange market. Additional p olicy measures included (i) the IM F's financial support; (ii) maturity extension agreem ent with foreign creditors on restructuring short-term debt; (iii) accelerating capital account liberalization; and (iv) global bond issuance. This m ulti-pronged approach successfully restored external stability and allow ed foreign reserves to be rebuilt. W hen a bank was recapitalized through the injection o f public funds, the government invariably controlled its management. The government-appointed bank managers were unw illing to change the status quo. They also had little incentive to collect overdue loans or to engage in Corporate sector 16 The London approach to corporate workout (out-of-court workout) differs from a court-supervised rehabilitation or receivership. The approach was taken because unlike the top-5 chaebols, most of the medium-size companies lacked access to bank credit or the capital markets and needed debt workouts or new loans to have any chance of meaningful restructuring. Preferential treatment was given in order to encourage banks to participate in the corporate restructuring process and to extend new loans to workout companies. However, it subsequently became clear that the lax provisioning requirement was a disincentive for banks to recognize true losses in debt workout cases and led to superficial corporate restructuring with debt rescheduling and long grace period. See Chopra et al. (2002) On D ecem ber 1997, an additional package o f p olicy measures to further re-enforce the stabilization w as announced. These m easures were aimed at strengthening econom ic stability and instilling confidence in the financial system as the regional instability proved to be more protracted than was earlier anticipated. The package included a further 18% reduction in governm ent expenditure, strict approval requirements for new investm ents and deferment o f im plem entation o f non-strategic and non-essential projects.
ii. M a cro eco n o m ic p o lic y resp o n ses to the crisis
Regarding the financial aspects, a com prehensive set o f m easures w ere im plem ented such as reclassifying the non-performing loans (NPLs) in arrears from six to three months, greater financial disclosure by financial institutions and increasing general provisions to 1.5%. The reclassification o f the N PLs was aimed at adhering to international financial practices and ensuring an earlier warning o f the rising NPLs. The Bank Negara also raised the three-month intervention rate from 10% to 11%, increased the m inim um risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio from 8% to 10% for finance com panies and reduced the single custom er lim it from 30% to 25%. The lev e l o f provisions against uncollateralised loans w as also raised to 20%. In addition, m inim um capital for finance com panies w as increased from RM 5 m illion to R M 300 m illion and subsequently to R M 600 m illion. The capital adequacy framework w as also expanded to incorporate market risks. In view o f the tight liquidity in the system , the statutory reserve requirement was reduced from 13.5% to 10%.
A s a measure to strengthen the balance o f paym ent position, a target w as set to reduce the current account deficit from 5% to 3% o f G DP in 1998 by lim iting imports and increasing import duties. Stricter criteria were also introduced for new overseas investm ents to reduce the outflow o f dom estic capital. ii.
Counter-cyclical m easures
The implementation o f the stabilization policy did not im prove the econom ic situation. In fact, the econom y continued to contract, capital outflow worsened and the ringgit exchange rate remained volatile and depreciated. Rejecting the IMF type prescription, M alaysia reversed its earlier response policies and 
Easing the monetary stance
A n important early measure was to increase liquidity and reduce the cost o f funds. In this regard, the statutory reserves requirement (SRR) was gradually reduced from 13.5% in February 1998 to 8% in July, 6% in September, and 4% in Decem ber 1998. W ith the reduction o f the SRR, an additional U S $10 b illion was injected into the banking system , w hich increased liquidity in the banking system, helping to overcom e the tight liquidity problem caused by the introduction o f the credit plan and cautious stance taken b y banking institutions.
The initial response o f increasing the interest rate had seriously affected the business comm unity. In the first quarter o f 1998, the effective lending rate w as on average about 22%. Therefore, the imm ediate task w as to reduce the cost o f funds. The base lending rate (BLR) was reduced from a high o f 12.3% in June 1998 to 6.8% in October 1999. Lending rates were consequently reduced from a high 24% in February 1998 to 7.9% in October 1999 and subsequently, in stages, to 6.4% in 2002. The low er borrowing costs and higher liquidity did not, however, produce high loan growth. Loan growth w as only 1% in 1998 and 1999 as compared to 27% in 1997. The lo w loan growth was due to both demand and supply factors: business conditions were still so lethargic for reviving new investm ents. M oreover, bankers were more cautious in extending loans to businesses. Equity liberalization was also carried out in other areas. M eanw hile, the 30% pre-crisis lim it on foreign ownership in the telecom m unications, stockbroking and insurance industries was raised to 61%, 49% , and 51%, respectively, although the lim it for the telecom m unications industry is scheduled to b e reduced to 49% after five years.
Selective capital controls
In addition, foreigners are now permitted to purchase all types o f properties above R M 250,000 for new projects or for projects that are 50% com pleted to reduce ex cess real estate supply. Previously, there were restrictions on foreigners buying landed properties. Figure 3 shows monetary policy stances o f both countries in terms o f the three-month inter-bank lending rate. In Korea, the annualized lending rate jum ped from 15.5% in N ovem ber 1997 to 25% in D ecem ber 1997 and then rem ained above 16% until June 1998. Then, it fell to 12% in July 1998; subsequently, to 10%, and substantially low er afterwards. In M alaysia, the lending rate decreased to 9.5% in A ugust 1998, w hich is low er than the 12.3% average for the entire year 1998, but a more substantial decrease o f the interest rate im m ediately follow ed the capital controls in September 1998 and remained low er than 7% afterwards. In general, there w as concern that a sharp depreciation o f the dom estic currency w ould create inflation. H ow ever, for both Korea and M alaysia, the financial crisis led only to a small increase in inflation, w hich enabled both countries to adopt expansionary policies. Third, in both countries, a favorable external environm ent and more export-oriented econom ic structure helped the quick recoveries. A s the crisis was induced by the private sector, the dom estic private sector w as not a likely candidate to lead the recovery. A s a consequence, an expansionary fiscal p olicy played a leading role in the recovery o f econom ic activity in both econom ies. M aintaining a current account surplus also helped to boost dom estic demand and stabilize the exchange rate. Robust export growth propelled the strong recovery in the manufacturing sector. Since the manufacturing sector generated a large share o f G DP in both countries, it becam e the engine o f recovery. The resulting large trade surpluses also boosted international reserves, turning a negative current account balance into a positive one and injecting liquidity into the econom y. This trade surplus was useful for reviving consum er demand and financing recovery m easures, particularly during the early crisis period. Docum ents prepared within ECLAC research project on M a n a g em e n t o f Volatility, F in a n cia l G lobalization a n d G 
